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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - PROCE-
DURAL DUE PROCESS - FIFTH AMENDMENT - JUST COMPENSA-
TION - The United States Supreme Court held that Procedural
Due Process does not entitle an owner of property forfeited under
a state nuisance abatement statute to a defense that the prop-
erty was used for an illegal purpose without the property owner's
knowledge or consent, and also held that a state is not required
to pay just compensation to an innocent co-owner of property for
his or her interest in property seized pursuant to a constitution-
ally sound abatement scheme.
Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
On October 3, 1988, two Detroit police officers observed John
Bennis ("Mr. Bennis") drive through a neighborhood notorious
for prostitution activity and stop his car in front of Kathy
Polarchio, who was "flagging" passing cars.' The officers
watched Ms. Polarchio enter the Bennis vehicle and proceed with
Mr. Bennis in the car for approximately one block before coming
to a stop.2 The two officers then approached the vehicle and after
observing Mr. Bennis and Ms. Polarchio engage in a sexual act,
arrested both individuals.
Mr. Bennis was convicted in the Circuit Court of Wayne
County, Michigan, of gross indecency.4 Subsequently, the Wayne
County prosecutor filed a complaint against Mr. Bennis and his
wife, Tina Bennis ("Mrs. Bennis"), alleging that the vehicle in
which Mr. Bennis committed gross indecency, jointly owned by
Mr. and Mrs. Bennis, was subject to abatement under Michigan's
1. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 996 (1996). The Michigan Supreme Court
defined flagging as "the manner in which prostitutes solicit business from potential cus-
tomers in passing vehicles." Michigan ex rel. Wayne County v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483,
486 n.2 (Mich. 1994).
2. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 486.
3. Id. The officers observed Ms. Polarchio performing an act of fellatio on Mr.
Bennis. Id.
4. Id. Michigan's gross indecency statute provides, in relevant part: "[Any male
person who, in public or private, commits or is a party to the commission of any act of
gross indecency with a female person shall be guilty of a felony, punishable as provided in
this section." MICH. Comp. LAws § 750.338b (1952).
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abatement statute for declared nuisances.5 The prosecutor
alleged that the vehicle was abatable as a nuisance8 under the
statute because it was used for prostitution.v
Mrs. Bennis defended the action on the ground that she did
not know of, or consent to, her husband's use of their vehicle to
violate Michigan's gross indecency statute.8 Unpersuaded by her
argument, the court abated Mrs. Bennis' interest in the car.9
The court's order, entered pursuant to the nuisance abatement
statute, forfeited the interests of both co-owners in the car and
provided no set-off for the interests of the innocent owner, Mrs.
Bennis.10
The court did not provide for Mrs. Bennis to be paid a portion
of the proceeds from the car's sale on the basis that practically no
money would be left to give her after the payment of abatement
5. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 996 n.2. Michigan's nuisance abatement statute sets
forth, in relevant part:
[Amny building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or place used for the purpose of lewd-
ness, assignation or prostitution.., is declared a nuisance .... Any person or his
or her servant, agent, or employee who owns, leases, conducts, or maintains any
building, vehicle or place used for any of the purposes or acts set forth in this sec-
tion is guilty of a nuisance.
MICH. Comp. LAws § 600.3801 (1988).
6. Abatement of a nuisance is "the removal, stoppage, prostration, or destruction
of that which causes a nuisance, whether by breaking or pulling it down, or otherwise
removing, destroying, or effacing it." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1066 (6th ed. 1991). An
abatable nuisance is "a nuisance which is practically susceptible of being suppressed, or
extinguished, or rendered harmless, and whose continued existence is not authorized
under the law." Id. at 4. A nuisance is commonly defined as "[tihat activity which arises
from unreasonable, unwarranted, or unlawful use by a person of his own property, work-
ing obstruction or injury to right of another, or to the public, and producing material
annoyance, inconvenience and discomfort that law will presume resulting damage." Id.
at 1065.
7. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997.
8. Id.
9. Id. Michigan's statutory abatement proceedings provides, in relevant part:
(1) Order of abatement. If the existence of the nuisance is established in
an action as provided in this chapter, an order of abatement shall be entered as a
part of the judgment in the case, which order. . . shall direct the sale thereof in the
manner provided for the sale of chattels under execution....
(2) Vehicles, sale. Any vehicle, boat, or aircraft found by the court to be a
nuisance within the meaning of this chapter, is subject to the same order and judg-
ment as any furniture, fixtures and contents as herein provided.
(3) Sale of personalty, costs, liens, balance to state treasurer. Upon the
sale of any furniture, fixtures, contents, vehicle, boat, or aircraft as provided in this
section, the officer executing the order of the court shall, after deducting the
expenses of keeping such property and costs of such sale, pay all liens according to
their priorities which may be established by intervention or otherwise at the hear-
ing or in other proceedings brought for that purpose as being bona fide and as
having been created without the lienor having any notice that such property was
being used or was to be used for the maintenance of a nuisance as herein defined,
and shall pay the balance to the state treasurer to be credited to the general fund of
the state.
MICH. Comp. LAws § 600.3825 (1963).
10. Bennis, 116 S. Ct at 996.
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costs." The court also refused to make this provision because
the Bennises owned another vehicle and therefore would not be
without any means of transportation.
12
The Michigan Court of Appeals subsequently reversed the trial
court's decision on two bases: (1) the one incident of lewdness in
which Mr. Bennis engaged was insufficient to constitute a nui-
sance, and (2) the interests of Mrs. Bennis in the Bennis vehicle
could not be forfeited since she did not know that Mr. Bennis
used the car to violate Michigan's gross indecency law. 
13
Although the court noted that a defendant's interest in property
may be abated notwithstanding his or her ignorance as to the
illegal use of the property, it nevertheless held that the prosecu-
tor in this case was required to show that Mrs. Bennis knew her
husband illegally used their vehicle prior to abating her interest
in that property. 14 Since the court found the record devoid of
proof that Mrs. Bennis had such knowledge, it vacated the trial
court's abatement order.'"
On December 30, 1994, the Supreme Court of Michigan
reversed the decision of the court of appeals.' 6 The supreme
court first found that Mr. Bennis' conduct was indeed lewd
17
within the meaning of the Michigan public nuisance statute
since he used the vehicle for prostitution. 8 The court then held
11. Id. at 997.
12. Id.
13. State of Michigan ex rel. Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney v. Bennis, 504
N.W.2d. 733 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993). The court based this conclusion on its earlier decision
in State ex rel. Oakland County Prosecutor v. Motorama Motel Corp., 307 N.W.2d 349
(Mich. Ct. App. 1981), in which it held: "[A] nuisance involves the notion of repeated or
continuing conduct and should not be based upon proof of a single isolated incident unless
the facts surrounding that incident permit the reasonable inference that the prohibited
conduct was habitual in nature." Motorama, 307 N.W.2d at 352 (emphasis added) (citing
People ex rel. Wayne Prosecuting Attorney v. Bitonti, 10 N.W.2d. 329, 331 (Mich. 1943)).
14. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d at 732. Michigan's statute sets forth that "proof of knowl-
edge of the existence of the nuisance on the part of the defendants ... is not required."
MICH. Cov. LAws § 600.3815(2) (1961). The Michigan Court of Appeals relied on People
v. Schoonmaker, 216 N.W. 456 (Mich. 1927), to conclude that an innocent co-owner's mere
permissive use or indifference to the use of his or her property by another is not sufficient
to reach the interests in property used for an illegal and abatable purpose. Schoonmaker,
216 N.W. at 457.
15. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d at 733.
16. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 483.
17. Id. at 487 n.10 (citing State ex rel. Wayne Co. Prosecutor v. Dizzy Duck, 511
N.W.2d 907 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994)). Michigan defines lewdness, within the meaning of its
nuisance abatement statute, as "those sexual acts... performed on another where done
for hire." Id. Lewdness is generally defined as "[g]ross and wanton indecency in sexual
relations so notorious as to tend to corrupt community's morals .... Any act which the
actor knows is likely to be observed by others who would be affronted or alarmed and
hence it is a criminal offense. . . ." BLACics LAw DIcTIoNARY 907 (6th ed. 1991).
18. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 487. The Court held that to fall within the meaning of
lewdness under the Michigan abatement statute, the conduct in question must be for or
1997 763
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that since the Bennis vehicle was used to perpetrate a lewd act,
according to Michigan's abatement statute both Bennis' interest
in the car were abatable. 19
The supreme court rejected Mrs. Bennis' innocent owner
defense, holding that an owner does not need to know that his or
her property has been illegally used in order to abate that prop-
erty interest.20 In response to Mrs. Bennis' argument that deny-
ing her this defense violated her Procedural Due Process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion,2' the court stated that such a defense has been consistently
rejected since the property is deemed the offender and, as such, is
freely forfeitable.22 The court found Mrs. Bennis' procedural due
process claim to be "without constitutional consequence,"23 and
held that the abatement of her interest in the vehicle was consti-
tutionally valid.24
Mrs. Bennis subsequently petitioned the United States
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which the Court
in relation to the purpose of prostitution. Id. The term assignation, as used in the abate-
ment statute, means the making of an appointment for purposes of prostitution. Id. As a
result, Mr. Bennis' conduct satisfied the statutory requirements of a nuisance without
proof that money was paid for the sexual act. Id. at 488.
19. Id. at 495. The Court determined that the neighborhood where Bennis was
arrested was a "place" within the meaning of the nuisance abatement statute. Id. at 490-
91. Individuals who drive their cars into neighborhoods for the purpose of soliciting pros-
titutes are using their cars to perpetuate the nuisance, and the car, as a result, is abata-
ble. Id. at 491.
20. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d at 737. The Court endeavored to resolve the confusion
associated with interpreting the seemingly plain language of M.C.L. § 600.3815(2) by dis-
tinguishing Schoonmaker and its progeny (which held that a defendant's knowledge of
the illegal use to which the property is put is required) from the plain language of the
statute and the precedent holding that an owner's knowledge of the illegal use of his or
her property is not required. Id. at 492-93; See State ex rel. Brucker v. Robinson, 229
N.W. 403, 405 (Mich.1930), Bitonti, 10 N.W.2d at 330, State ex rel. Dowling v. Tate, 11
N.W.2d 282, 283 (Mich. 1943). The Court posited that Schoonmaker is distinguishable
from the instant case because that case involved the abatement proceedings of a dance
hall in which the alleged illegal activity, consuming alcohol, occurred outside the hall and
was not associated with the property. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 493. The Schoonmaker
court held that the hall was not subject to abatement since the illegal activity occurred
outside the hall and without the control of the property owner. Schoonmaker, 216 N.W.
at 457. Less than three years after deciding Schoonmaker, however, the Michigan
Supreme Court held that the nuisance abatement statute "expressly obviates the need of
knowledge on the part of the owner of nuisance use of his premises." Robinson, 229 N.W.
at 405.
21. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant
part: "[NIor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
22. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 494.
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granted.25 Upon certiorari, the Supreme Court considered two
issues: (1) whether Mrs. Bennis was deprived of a property inter-
est without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution by being denied
the innocent owner defense; and (2) whether abating Mrs. Ben-
nis' interest in her automobile constituted a taking of private
property for a public purpose without just compensation in viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution,26
which is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.27
In addressing the first issue, the Supreme Court acknowledged
that a long, unbroken line of cases holds that an owner's interest
in property may be forfeited as a result of the property's illegal
use regardless of whether the owner is aware that the property
was used for such a purpose.28 Utilizing admiralty forfeiture29
precedent dating back to 1827, the Court reasoned that an inno-
cent owner's interest in property may be forfeited either on the
basis that the object itself is the offender, or the offense is inex-
tricably linked to the object utilized to complete the illegal act.3 °
The Court then noted that forfeiting property entrusted by an
innocent owner to one who uses it for an illegal purpose does not
violate due process 3' since the law regards certain uses of prop-
erty as so repugnant that the innocent owner who entrusts the
25. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997. A writ of certiorari is "[a]n order by the appellate
court which is used by that court when it has discretion on whether or not to hear an
appeal from a lower court." BLACiKs LAw DIcTioNARY 1609 (6th ed. 1991). If the writ is
denied, the court refuses to hear the appeal and, in effect, the judgment below stands
unchanged. Id. If the writ is granted, then it has the effect of ordering the lower court to
certify and send the record up to the higher court that used discretion to hear the appeal.
Id. In the United States Supreme Court, a review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of
right, but of judicial discretion, and will only be granted when there are "special and
important reasons therefore." Id. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1254, 1257(1948); SuP. CT. R. 10.
26. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent
part: "[N]o person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CoNsT. amend. V, cl. 4.
27. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998.
28. Id.
29. Id. See, e.g., The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1 (1827); Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S.
210 (1844). Forfeiture is a broad term generally meaning the divestiture of property
rights without compensation. BLACi's LAw DIcTIoNARY 650 (6th ed. 1991). In the context
of Bennis and the cases cited therein, the term means a loss of a property right as a
penalty for some illegal act. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998.
30. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998 (citing The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14).
31. Id. (citing Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 467-68 (1926)). The Court in
Van Oster held: "[1it has long been settled that statutory forfeitures of property entrusted
by the innocent owner or lienor to another who uses it in violation of the revenue laws of
the United States is not a violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment."
Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 467-68.
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property does so at his or her own peril.3 2 Further, the Court
held that although forfeitures serve a punitive purpose and are
subject to the Eighth Amendment prohibition against excessive
fines, this limitation was not at issue in the present case for two
reasons.34 First, the parties never contested the fact that this
case constituted an equitable action3 5 and therefore the trial
court had broad discretion to fashion remedies including the
abatement of the Bennis vehicle.36 Second, forfeiture statutes
serve a legitimate deterrent purpose because they render illegal
behavior unprofitable by preventing the future illegal use of the
property.37 The Court concluded that forfeiture actions are "too
firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the
country to be now displaced."-8
In addressing the second issue in the case, the Court simply
noted that the Bennis vehicle was transferred to the state pursu-
ant to a constitutionally sound abatement scheme rather than
through the exercise of eminent domain.39 As a result, there was
no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause,4 °
32. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 996 (quoting Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 467-68).
33. Id. at 1000 (citing Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2810 (1993)). The
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "[E]xcessive bail shall not
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
34. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000.
35. An equitable action is one in which an equitable remedy is sought, although in
federal and most state courts the procedural merger of law and equity has produced only
one type of action - a civil action. BLAciKs LAW DIcTioNARY 538 (6th ed. 1991). Equitable
relief is sought from a court with equitable powers when an aggrieved party does not have
an adequate remedy at law and only an injunction or a decree of specific performance,
rather than money damages, will provide the moving party with adequate relief. Id. at
539.
36. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000 (citing Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 485).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1001 (quoting J.W. Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505,
511 (1921))(holding that forfeiture law authorizing seizure of property used to commit an
illegal act without consideration of property owner's ignorance as to use of property is "too
firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now
displaced").
39. Id. Eminent domain is: "[Tihe power to take private property for public use by
the state, municipalities, and private persons or corporations authorized to exercise func-
tions of public character." BLAcK's LAw DICTONARY 523 (6th ed. 1991). The Fifth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution precludes the exercise of eminent domain, also
referred to as condemnation, without paying just compensation to the owners of the prop-
erty taken. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
40. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1001. In deciding whether Michigan was required to pay
Mrs. Bennis just compensation for abating her interest in the automobile, the Court cited
only United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973), as precedent. Id. In Fuller, the respon-
dents operated a large "cow-calf" ranch in Arizona on 1,280 acres they owned, 12,027
acres they leased from the state of Arizona and 31,461 acres of federal domain land used
by Fuller pursuant to Taylor Act permits. Fuller, 409 U.S. at 488-89 (citing The Taylor
Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1934)). The United States condemned 920 acres of
766
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and the government was not required to compensate Mrs. Bennis
for her interest in the vehicle.4 '
In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas noted that the Bennis
majority decision illustrates the fact that the Federal Constitu-
tion does not protect against every unwanted action.42 Justice
Thomas highlighted that regardless of how unfair forfeiting Mrs.
Bennis' interest in her car may seem, the Court's forfeiture pre-
cedent, dating back to 1827, forecloses the innocent owner
defense.43
Justice Ginsburg, in a separate concurring opinion, stated that
the only issue in this case was whether Mrs. Bennis was consti-
tutionally entitled to a portion of the proceeds from the sale of
her car.44 Justice Ginsburg then stated that since the trial court
went to great lengths to find that the fair market value of the car,
a mere $600.00, rendered it impossible upon sale to pay Mrs.
Bennis her interest in the vehicle, the court acted in a fair man-
ner.41 In conclusion, Justice Ginsburg stated that Michigan was
not setting out to punish innocent third parties by abating the
Bennis vehicle, but was rather utilizing its abatement proceed-
ings to further the legitimate government interest in preventing
prostitution.46
Fuller's land owned in fee simple, and Fuller contended that in computing the just com-
pensation for these acres, the fair market value must include the land's value in conjunc-
tion with its proximity to and use with the federal grazing lands. Id. The government
contended that it should not be required to pay just compensation for value that it had
created by issuing Fuller the revocable Taylor Act permits. Id. While this case and the
issue it presented is not consistent with the just compensation issue of Bennis, the Bennis
Court relied on a general principal expounded by the Fuller Court, which was that the
government is not required to pay just compensation for value that it had created or for
taking property pursuant to a power other than that of eminent domain. Bennis, 116 S.
Ct. at 1001; See Fuller, 409 U.S. at 492 (emphasis added).
41. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1001 (citing Fuller, 409 U.S. at 492).
42. Id. at 1001-02. Justice Thomas specifically stated, "It]his case is ultimately a
reminder that the Federal Constitution does not prohibit everything that is intensely
undesirable." Id.
43. Id. at 1001. See J.W. Goldsmith Jr.-Grant Co., 254 U.S. at 510.
44. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1003. Justice Ginsburg noted that the critical inquiry is
whether the vehicle was used without the owner's consent or with the owner's consent but
in a manner that the owner had neither consented to nor foreseen. Id. Justice Ginsburg
concluded that Mrs. Bennis fell into the latter category, since she and Mr. Bennis had
equal rights to use and possess the car and each had the implied consent of the other to
use the car. Id.
45. Id. Justice Ginsburg also relied on the impracticality of ordering Mrs. Bennis
to be paid a portion of the proceeds. Id. Justice Ginsburg reiterated that the Bennises
had another vehicle and the abated car was purchased for the paltry sum of $600.00,
meaning there would be nothing left to pay Mrs. Bennis after paying the costs associated
with the abatement proceeding. Id.
46. Id. Justice Ginsburg stated: "Michigan, in short, has not embarked on an
experiment to punish innocent third parties .... Michigan has decided to deter Johns
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Writing in dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Breyer
and Souter, distinguished between three classes of property sub-
ject to forfeiture: pure contraband, 7 proceeds from criminal
activity and the tools or instrumentalities that a criminal uses to
accomplish illicit conduct. 4'8 According to Justice Stevens, the
first category of property is routinely subject to forfeiture without
controversy. 49 The second category of property, which tradition-
ally covered stolen property but was expanded by federal legisla-
tion to include proceeds from criminal ventures,5 ° does not
typically produce cases regarding whether due process demands
an innocent owner defense.5 ' Justice Stevens then noted that the
seizure of property falling under the final category, termed
"derivative contraband," is more troublesome because its reach
has the potential to be overly broad and the government's reme-
dial interest in abating this property is less obvious.52
Justice Stevens asserted that more than one illegal use of
"derivative contraband" is required for its forfeiture.53 He also
opined that in order for such property to be abated, it must actu-
ally facilitate or be necessary to accomplishing the crime in ques-
tion.54 Since the Bennis car was used as little more than a
from using cars they own (or co-own) to contribute to neighborhood blight, and that abate-
ment endeavor hardly warrants this Court's disapprobation." Id.
47. Contraband is generally defined as "any property which is unlawful to produce
or possess. Things and objects outlawed and subject to forfeiture and destruction upon
seizure." BLAcK'S LAw DICTIONARY 322 (6th ed. 1991).
48. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1004. The first category, pure contraband, consists of
items such as "adulterated food, sawed-off shotguns, narcotics and smuggled goods." Id.
The third category, tools of the criminal's trade, also known as derivative contraband,
includes ships, and, as in the present case, cars. Id.
49. Id. With respect to pure contraband, the mere possession of the chattel consti-
tutes a crime, and therefore the government's remedial interest is great. Id.
50. Id. Federal statutes providing for the forfeiture of proceeds from criminal
activity commonly have innocent owner protections built into them since a rule of strict
liability for forfeiture of proceeds from a criminal enterprise could have disastrous impli-
cations for the nation's economy. Id. at n.1. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §881(a)(6) (1970).
51. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1004.
52. Id. at 1005. See, e.g., Phile v. Ship Anna, 1 U.S. 197, 206 (C.P. Phila. Cty.
1787), in which the court held that the forfeiture of an entire ship and its cargo was
inappropriate if a single item of contraband on board was "a trifling thing, easily con-
cealed, and which might fairly escape the notice of the captain." Ship Anna, 1 U.S. at
206.
53. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1005. Justice Stevens stated, "[t]here is no evidence in
the record that the car had previously been used for a similar purpose. An isolated misuse
of a stationary vehicle should not justify the forfeiture of an innocent owner's property on
the theory that it constituted an instrumentality of the crime." Id.
54. Id. at 1006. See Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 498-99 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). The
Bennis vehicle was merely a convenient location to accomplish the illegal act. Id. at 498.
A single illegal use of the car would warrant its abatement if the car was an indispensable
tool to accomplishing the proscribed act. Id. at 498-99. Therefore, without an inference of
habitual or continued illegal use of the car, abatement is improper. Id. at 499.
768
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convenient enclosure for a one-time event, according to Justice
Stevens, its potential forfeiture should be governed by the
Court's decisions governing the forfeiture of real property.
Under this line of precedent, forfeiture of property is not an
option when the property is used for an isolated criminal
transaction.55
Justice Stevens further posited that the Court's decision in
Austin v. United States5" required reversal in Bennis because a
condition precedent to forfeiting an innocent owner's interest in
property is the owner's negligent entrustment of that property to
the wrongdoer.5 7 Since Mrs. Bennis did not negligently entrust
her husband with the use of the family car, according to Justice
Stevens, no forfeiture should have occurred. 58
In conclusion, Justice Stevens stated that the penalty imposed
upon Mrs. Bennis was dramatically out of proportion to her
blameworthiness since she merely allowed Mr. Bennis to use
their car to commute back and forth to work.59 Justice Stevens
opined that regardless of whether the forfeiture proceedings are
characterized as remedial or punitive, Mrs. Bennis' entire inter-
est was abated without any consideration for her co-ownership of
the car.6 °
55. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1006 (citing United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 515 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (stating difficulty in forfeiting real property that bears no connection to crime other
than serving as locus for criminal transaction)).
56. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
57. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1007. Justice Stevens noted that the Court in Austin,
only three terms prior to Bennis, analyzed the same precedent employed by the Bennis
majority to affirm the abatement of Mrs. Bennis' vehicle, and came to the conclusion that
the innocent owner is not strictly liable for the wrongs committed by one to whom the
owner entrusted the property. Id. at 1007 (citingAustin, 509 U.S. at 614-15). Rather, the
owner must have negligently entrusted the property. Id. Justice Stevens concluded that
since Mrs. Bennis did not and could not have negligently entrusted the car to Mr. Bennis,
who had an equal right to use and enjoy the car, no forfeiture should have resulted.
Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1007.
58. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1007.
59. Id. at 1010. The punishment Mrs. Bennis incurred, loss of her one-half interest
in the car, was, according to Justice Stevens, clearly excessive and therefore violative of
the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution's Excessive Fines Clause. Id. According
to Justice Stevens, stripping one of all right, title and interest in property without one
iota of blameworthiness for the illegal act that took place in the front seat is clearly an
excessive punishment. Id.
60. Id. at 1008-09. The distinction drawn by the majority between the deterrent
and punitive purposes of Michigan's abatement statute is a distinction without a differ-
ence since punishment is intended to have a deterrent effect. Id. Justice Stevens further
noted that abating Mrs. Bennis' interest in the car will not serve any deterrent purpose
since she was completely uninvolved and unaware of the illegal conduct. Id. Therefore,
"there is no reason to think that the threat of forfeiture will deter an individual from
buying a car with her husband - or from marrying him in the first place." Id. at 1009
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Finally, Justice Kennedy, in a separate dissenting opinion,
argued that the Court's admiralty and maritime forfeiture law,
while substantial and unbroken, is not applicable to the instant
case.6 1 Agreeing with Justice Stevens, Justice Kennedy stated
that forfeiting property pursuant to the strict liability traditions
of admiralty forfeiture should not be employed to affirm seizures
in all instances.2 Justice Kennedy then concluded that forfeiting
Mrs. Bennis' interest in the vehicle does not meet the require-
ments of due process without proof that she negligently
entrusted the car to her husband or was in some other way com-
plicit in the criminal activity.
63
The earliest Supreme Court case supporting the proposition
that a defendant may suffer forfeiture of property used illegally
without knowing that the property was put to such use is The
Palmyra.' This 1827 admiralty case involved the attempted
civil in rem65 forfeiture of an armed brig, The Palmyra, for
alleged violations of the Piracy Acts. 66 The pertinent issue con-
sidered by The Palmyra Court was whether an action in rem may
61. Id. at 1010. Justice Kennedy noted that admiralty forfeiture evolved from the
practical necessity of obtaining some source of compensation for those injured by vessels;
the owners of which were half a world away. Id. at 1010. The innocent owner defense
was necessarily rejected in early admiralty cases because it would have been impossible
to adjudicate the innocence of vessel owners or their good faith efforts in finding a reliable
captain and crew for the vessel. Id.
62. Id. at 1011. Justice Kennedy argues that the Court's admiralty forfeiture pre-
cedent can remain valid and viable without extending it in every similar instance to an
automobile which, in modem day life, is a necessity for many Americans. Id.
63. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1011.
64. 25 U.S. 1 (1827). The Palmyra was an armed brig asserted by its master and
crew to be a privateer. Id. at 8. A privateer is "a vessel owned, equipped, and armed by
one or more private individuals, and duly commissioned by a belligerent power to go on
cruises and make war upon the enemy, usually by preying on his commerce." BLAcK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1195 (6th ed. 1991). The Palmyra was acting under a commission of the
King of Spain. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 8. It was captured August 15, 1822 by the United
States Warship Grampus and sent to Charleston, SC for adjudication pursuant to the
Piracy Acts. Id. The district court did not order the Palmyra's forfeiture and denied dam-
ages. Id. The United States and the claimants representing the Palmyra appealed. Id.
at 8-9. The circuit court affirmed the district court's order not to forfeit the brig, but
reversed the denial of damages and awarded $10,288.58. Id. at 9. The United States
appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the order not to forfeit the brig but
reversed the damages award. Id. at 18.
65. An in rem action is one in which proceedings are taken directly against prop-
erty. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 793 (6th ed. 1991).
66. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 8. The Piracy Acts stated, in relevant part:
[Tihat whenever any vessel or boat from which any piratical aggression...
shall be captured and brought into any port of the United States, the same shall
and may be adjudged and condemned to their use, and that of the captors, after
due process and trial, in any Court having admiralty jurisdiction, and ... the same
Court shall thereupon order a sale and distribution thereof accordingly, and at
their discretion.
Piracy Acts, Ch. 75, § 4 (1819), reenacted Ch. 112, § 4 (1820).
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be sustained without first securing an in personam67 conviction
against the human wrongdoer. 6  The Court concluded that a
property owner's interest in his or her property may indeed be
forfeited without such a prior conviction 9.6  The Court reasoned
that such forfeiture is logical because the property used to com-
mit the offense is deemed the offender, or, at least, the illicit con-
duct is inexorably attached to the property.7 °
In Harmony v. United States,71 a later case also involving an
admiralty jurisdiction forfeiture, the United States Supreme
Court addressed the in rem forfeiture of property owned by an
individual who was without knowledge as to the property's illicit
use.72 The vessel forfeited in Harmony was condemned pursuant
to the Piracy Acts because it was used for piratical aggression.73
The defendant-owner of the vessel asserted the innocent owner
defense as a basis for protecting his property from forfeiture.74
In response, the Court noted that the Piracy Acts provided no
express protection for an innocent owner because condemnation
proceedings pursuant to the Acts were in rem and thus essen-
tially against the guilty instrument in which the piratical acts
were committed. 75 Therefore, the owner's vessel was forfeitable
67. A proceeding in personam is one in which jurisdiction over the defendant is
first secured so that a judgment involving his or her individual rights may be adjudicated.
BLAci's LAw DIcTIoNARY 791 (6th ed. 1991).
68. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14. The common law rule was that in felony cases, an
action in rem for the forfeiture of goods or chattels to the sovereign could not be sustained
until the wrongdoer was convicted of the offense. Id. The Palmyra Court distinguished
common law forfeitures resulting from offenses against the Crown from civil forfeitures
flowing from statutory authority. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 14. The oft-cited rule established by The Palmyra Court is "Ithe thing is
here primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offence is attached primarily to
the thing ...." Id.
71. 43 U.S. 210 (1844).
72. Harmony, 43 U.S. at 210. This case is also captioned United States v. Brig
Malek Adel because the United States sought the forfeiture of both the vessel and its
cargo. Id. at 211. The district court ordered the condemnation of the brig, but restored
the cargo to the claimants. Id. at 230. Thus, on appeal, the full caption of the case read:
Peter Harmony and others, Claimants of the Brig Malek Adel v. United States. United
States v. the Cargo of the Brig Malek Adel, 43 U.S. 210 (1844).
73. Harmony, 43 U.S. at 229. The five vessels against which the Brig Malek Adel
allegedly asserted piratical aggression and restraint on the high seas were the American
vessels named the Sullivan and the Emily Wilder, the British vessels named the Madras
and the Albert, and an unknown Portugese vessel. Id.
74. Id. at 230. The defendant-owner in Harmony was the first to raise the inno-
cent owner defense. Id. at 233. If the Court found the Malek Adhel to be an armed vessel
that committed piratical acts within the meaning of the Piracy Acts, then the next issue,
according to the Court, was whether the brig or its cargo were subject to condemnation
"because the owners neither participated in nor authorized the piratical acts, but [were]
entirely innocent thereof.... . Id. at 230.
75. Id. at 233. The Court stated: "The vessel which commits the aggression is
treated as the offender, as the guilty instrument or thing to which the forfeiture attaches,
Duquesne Law Review
regardless of the owner's ignorance as to the vessel's participa-
tion in acts of piratical aggression.76
In 1877, the United States Supreme Court decided Dobbins'
Distillery v. United States, 77 which involved an owner's lease of
real property to another who operated a distillery on the prop-
erty.78 The individual operating the distillery violated certain
revenue laws, and, as a result, defrauded the government of tax
revenue.79 The statutory penalty for failure to comply with the
revenue laws was forfeiture of the distillery equipment, personal
property used in the business and the land upon which the distil-
lery was operated to the United States Government. °
The owner of the land asserted the innocent owner defense
and met the same fate as the defendant in Harmony.8 1 The
Court noted that the revenue law attached the committed wrong
to the land, personalty and trade fixtures used to operate the dis-
tillery. 2 As a result, the land owner who leased real property to
a distiller violating the revenue laws was to be treated under the
statute as if he was the distiller.8 3 Moreover, since the forfeiture
proceedings were civil and purely in rem, and the in personam
culpability of the lessee must be established in independent
criminal proceedings, the Court held that the knowledge, respon-
sibility or cooperation of the owner in the fraudulent acts was
without any reference whatsoever to the character or conduct of the owner." Id. The
Harmony decision was the first to expressly provide that property interests of an innocent
owner may be forfeited with respect to property used in an illegal venture. Id. at 234.
76. Id. The Court held:
[In short, the acts of the master and crew, in cases of this sort, [admiralty
forfeitures] bind the interest of the owner of the ship, whether he be innocent or
guilty; and he impliedly submits to whatever the law denounces as a forfeiture
attached to the ship by reason of their unlawful or wanton wrongs.
Id.
77. 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
78. Dobbins' Distillery, 96 U.S. at 396.
79. Id. The lessee, operator of the distillery, was found to have violated various
provisions of the revenue laws of 1868 pertaining to keeping complete and accurate books.
Id. Specifically, the lessee was charged with either negligently or intentionally not keep-
ing the books required by the revenue laws, not making the entries mandated by the
statute, making false entries in the books that were maintained and omitting certain
facts from the books, all with the intent to defraud the government. Id. Additionally, the
lessee was charged with intentionally concealing facts required to be stated in the books
and intentionally failing to produce the books upon the request of the revenue officers.
Id.
80. Id. at 400-01.
81. Id. at 399. The Court found the innocent owner defense to be without merit.
Id.
82. Id. at 400.
83. Dobbins'Distilley, 96 U.S. at 399-400. The Court stated: "If [the owner] know-
ingly suffers and permits his land to be used as a site for a distillery, the law places him
on the same footing as if he were the distiller." Id.
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irrelevant.8 4 In conclusion, the Court noted that in many areas
of the law, the interests of innocent property owners in their
property are determined by the unlawful acts of those in lawful
possession of the property.
5
In J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States,6 the
United States sought the forfeiture of an automobile used to
transport liquor in a manner such that liquor taxes were
evaded.8 7 The parties holding equitable title to the car, Thomp-
son and Lamb, used the car to violate federal revenue laws with-
out the knowledge of the Grant Company, who was the car dealer
and holder of the car's legal title.8
In the forfeiture action, the Grant Company contended that
only the interests of Thompson and Lamb in the car could be for-
feited since proper construction of the revenue statute resulted
in forfeiting only the wrongdoer's property interest.8 9 While not-
ing that this argument had considerable appeal in the abstract,
the Court held that statutory seizures pursuant to the revenue
laws are too firmly embedded in this country's punitive and
remedial jurisprudence to be suddenly discarded.90 The Court
then rejected the Grant Company's contention that prior deci-
sions in this area were in some way due to the relation between
the parties and the forfeited property or its use.9 ' In conclusion,
the Court noted that the illegal use of forfeited property is the
central issue in statutory forfeiture cases, and the owner's guilt
or innocence with respect to the use of the property is of no
consequence.92
84. Id. (citing The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14). The common law doctrine, under which
an in personam conviction had to be secured, produced and presented against a felon in
order to forfeit the felon's chattels to the crown, "was never applied to seizures and forfeit-
ures created by statute in rem .... " Id.
85. Id. at 401 (citing Harmony, 43 U.S. at 233-34).
86. 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
87. J. W. Goldsmith, Jr., 254 U.S. at 508.
88. Id. Thompson and two others used the automobile to transport fifty-eight gal-
lons of distilled liquor, upon which a tax was levied but not paid. Id. When federal
authorities seized the car, the Grant Company was permitted upon petition to regain
possession of the car after posting a surety bond. Id. J.W. Goldsmith, Jr. was Grant's
surety. Id.
89. Id. at 509. Counsel for Grant argued at length that requiring an innocent
party to suffer due to the acts of a separate guilty party should be unconstitutional as
against reason and justice. Id. at 510.
90. Id. at 511 (citing Dobbins Distillery, 96 U.S. at 395).
91. Id. at 512.
92. J.W. Goldsmith, Jr., 254 U.S. at 513. The Court also expressly reserved the
question as to whether an innocent owner's interest in property could be forfeited due to
the acts of one who has possession of the property without the owner's knowledge or con-
sent. Id. at 512.
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In the 1926 case of Van Oster v. Kansas, 93 the Court was faced
with the issue of whether an automobile owner's property inter-
ests could be forfeited when her vehicle was used to illegally
transport liquor by a dealership to whom she entrusted the car.94
The owner of the car intervened and defended the forfeiture
action on the basis that she was without knowledge that her car
was illegally used.95
The Court rejected the innocent owner defense, asserting that
the law commonly visits upon property owners the unpleasant
consequences the result from the acts of those to whom the prop-
erty is entrusted.' Moreover, the Court stated that there are
certain uses of property that are so egregious and undesirable
that an owner who surrenders control of the property later used
for such purposes does so at his or her peril. 97 The Court then
noted that with respect to this case, a state's police power encom-
passes the state's right to forfeit property used in violation of
state laws prohibiting liquor traffic.9 In conclusion, the Court
held that forfeiting an owner's interest in property entrusted to
one who uses the property in violation of United States revenue
laws violates neither the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment nor the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.99
In 1979, the Court decided Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co, 00 in which the interests of Pearson, an American
company, were forfeited when co-lessees of one of its yachts vio-
93. 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
94. Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 466. Van Oster purchased the car from a local dealer.
Id. One condition of sale was that the vendors be permitted to use the car in their busi-
ness. Id. An associate of the dealer, Clyde Brown, was permitted to use the car fre-
quently with Van Oster's knowledge. Id. Kansas police officers arrested Brown for
transporting illegal intoxication liquors, and the state sought the forfeiture of the car as a
common nuisance pursuant to REV. ST. KAN. § 21-2162 et seq (1919). Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 467.
97. Id. As examples, the Court cited statutes imposing liability on car owners for
the negligent use of automobiles by the individual to whom the owner entrusted the auto-
mobile. Id. (citing LAws OF NEW YORK, 1924, c. 534 (1924); PuB. AcTs MICH. 1915, Act
No. 302, § 29 (1915)).
98. Id. (citing Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 9 (1888)).
99. Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 467-68 (citing J.W. Goldsmith, Jr. Grant Co. v United
States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921), and Dobbins' Distillery, 96 U.S. 395 (1877)). The Court did
not find a valid distinction between the Fourteenth Amendment's application to the exer-
cise of a state's police power and the application of the Fifth Amendment to the federal
government's exercise of its taxing power. Id. at 468. The Court noted that a state's
exercise of its police power is as plenary as the federal government's exercise of its taxing
power. Id.
100. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
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lated Puerto Rican controlled substance laws.1° ' The forfeiture of
the vessel was accomplished pursuant to a statutory forfeiture
scheme. 10 2 Pearson did not learn of the yacht's seizure and forfei-
ture until it attempted to repossess the yacht from the lessees for
nonpayment of rent.0 3 All parties in the case conceded that
Pearson was not involved in the lessees' criminal venture and
had no knowledge that its yacht was used to violate Puerto Rican
drug laws.1 4
Pearson principally defended the action on the basis that it
was denied notice and a prior adversarial hearing before the
yacht was seized as required by Puerto Rican law. 10 5 The Court
found this contention to be without merit on the basis that exi-
gencies involved in forfeiture seizures constitute the rare and
narrow instances where pre-seizure notice and hearings are not
required.
10 6
101. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 665. The lessees were arrested for violating the
Controlled Substances Act of Puerto Rico, P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 24, § 2101 et seq. (Supp.
1973). Id. The Superintendent of Police seized the yacht pursuant to P.R. LAws ANN. tit.
24, § 2512 (aX4),(b) (Supp. 1973), which states that vessels used in the transportation of,
or to facilitate the transportation of, controlled substances, including marijuana, are sub-
ject to seizure and forfeiture to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Id. at 666 (citing P.R.
LAws ANN. tit. 24, § 2512(aX4),(b) (Supp. 1973)).
102. Id. at 665. See also P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 34, §1722 (Supp. 1973), which provides
that: (a) only duly appointed officials and officers of the Puerto Rican government may
initiate forfeiture proceedings; (b) notice to interested parties, such as owners, lessors,
lessees, bailors, bailees, etc. is required within ten days of seizure; and (c) challenge to the
seizure must be commenced within fifteen days after service of notice. Id. at 665-69 n.2.
103. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 668. Section 1722(a) of the Puerto Rican Uniform
Vehicle, Mount, Vessel and Plane Seizure Act requires that the owner of seized property,
or the person in charge of the property to be seized, be served with notice of the seizure
within ten days of the seizure. Id. at 665 n.2 (citing P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 34, § 1722(a)
(Supp. 1973)). Puerto Rican authorities seized the vessel without notice to Pearson or
either of Pearson's lessees and without a pre-seizure hearing. Id. at 667.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 667. After the Puert Rican authorities seized the vessel, they provided
the ten day statutory notice as required under section 1722 of the Uniform Vehicle,
Mount, Vessel and Plane Seizure Act to the lessees but not to Pearson Yacht Company,
the vessel's owner. Id. Since Pearson was completely unaware of the illegal use of its
yacht and the yacht's seizure by Puerto Rican authorities, he did not and could not chal-
lenge the seizure within the fifteen day period provided by the statute. Id. See P.R. LAws
ANN., tit. 34, § 1722(c) (Supp. 1973). As a result, the yacht was forfeited for the official
use of the Puerto Rican government. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 668. See P.R. LAws ANN.,
tit. 34, § 1722(c) (Supp. 1973).
106. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 668. Pearson contended that Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 90 (1992) and its progeny required the Puerto Rican statutory forfeiture proce-
dures to afford it pre-forfeiture notice and an adversarial hearing, Id. at 677. The Court
disagreed, holding that a seizure for purposes of forfeiture was an extraordinary situation
that justified postponing notice and opportunity for a hearing. Id. at 677 (citing Fuentes,
407 U.S. at 90). The Court cited the Fuentes case in support of this position, which delin-
eated three exceptions to the rule requiring notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior
to seizure. Id. The three circumstances arise when: (1) [T]he seizure has been directly
necessary to secure an important governmental or general public interest; (2) there has
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The Court then turned to the issue of whether an owner's
interest in property can be forfeited when the property is used in
a criminal venture. 1 7 After exploring the long history of common
law forfeitures, 08 the Court concluded that the innocent owner
defense has been uniformly rejected from the time it was first
raised. 0 9 The Court then upheld the constitutionality of the
Puerto Rican forfeiture statute, finding that the statutory
scheme is well within the police powers of the Commonwealth
and furthers legitimate punitive and deterrent purposes with
respect to criminal activity. 110
The most recent decision of the Supreme Court concerning the
statutory forfeiture of property is Austin v. United States."'
Although cited by the dissent in Bennis, Austin involved neither
an innocent owner defense nor a due process question." 2 More-
over, the statute under which the federal government attempted
to seize and forfeit the defendant's property in Austin provided
been a special need for very prompt action; and (3) the State has kept strict control over
its monopoly of legitimate force. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91-92.
107. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680. Pearson argued that United States v. United
States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971) overruled the precedent holding that an
owner's interest in property used illegally can be forfeited without inquiring into the
owner's guilt or innocence. Id. at 680. The Court disagreed, finding that the district
court's reliance on United States Coin & Currency was misplaced since that case involved
whether an individual operating an illegal bookmaking operation, from whom money was
seized, could assert the privilege against self-incrimination in a forfeiture proceeding. Id.
at 688. While the individuals in that case could assert the privilege since the applicable
statute imposed a penalty only on those significantly involved in the criminal operation,
the applicable statutes in The Palmyra, Harmony, Dobbins' Distillery, Van Oster and
Goldsmith-Grant forfeited the interests in property of anyone with title or a possessory
interest in the property notwithstanding their involvement in the criminal operation.
See, e.g., The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 7-8; Harmony, 43 U.S. at 229; Dobbins' Distillery, 96
U.S. at 401; Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 466; J.R. Goldsmith, Jr., 254 U.S. at 512.
108. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 681-82.
109. Id. at 683.
110. Id. at 686. The Court appeared to create an opening for future litigation on
this point, however, because it nevertheless held that the Appellee's interest in the yacht
was properly forfeitable since Appellee voluntarily entrusted the yacht to the lessess and
proffered no evidence that it had done everything reasonably possible to prevent the prop-
erty from being used illegally. Id. at 690. The Court opined that an owner able to prove
that he or she (1) was not involved in and did not know of the criminal use of his or her
property, and (2) had done everything reasonably possible to prevent the illicit use of the
property, would have a sound constitutional claim because a forfeiture under those cir-
cumstances would be unduly oppressive and serve no legitimate government purpose. Id.
at 689-90 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
111. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
112. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1007 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens asserted
that the forfeiture precedent discussed in Bennis rested "at bottom, on the notion that the
owner has been negligent in allowing his property to be misused and that he is properly
punished for his negligence." Id. (quoting Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 615
(1993)).
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innocent owner defenses, unlike any of the statutes involved in
the cases discussed previously.
113
The Austin Court opined that prior case law interpreting stat-
utory forfeitures was based on the tort doctrine of negligent
entrustment.114 The Court also found that this forfeiture law has
been based on the legal fiction that the property used for an ille-
gal purpose constitutes the guilty party.1 5 The Court then criti-
cized this legal fiction, reasoning that a forfeiture should not
result if the property owner did not negligently entrust the prop-
erty and did everything reasonably possible to prevent the illegal
use of the property." 6 In conclusion, the Court stated that the
issue of whether the interest of a truly innocent property owner
in his or her property could be forfeited has actually been
reserved by the Court in earlier precedent." 7 The Court then
found that the issue could not be considered presently because
the statute at issue in Austin exempts innocent owners. 118
The United States Supreme Court's ruling in Bennis has done
nothing more than reaffirm a longstanding and basic holding
that with regard to statutory forfeitures, the innocence of any
defendant, including an owner of the property abated, is of no
consequence. The Court was correct in stating that a long line of
113. Austin, 509 U.S. at 604-05. The government attempted to seize the property
pursuant to the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, which provides, in relevant part:
All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, vessels, which are used, are
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation,
sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of (controlled substances), except that
(C) no conveyance shall be forfeited under this paragraph to the extent of
an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner
to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge, consent or willful blind-
ness of the owner.
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any
leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or
improvements, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to
commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter... except
that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of an interest
of an owner, by reason of any act or omission, established by that owner to have been
committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(4)(C),(7) (1970) (emphasis added).
114. Austin, 509 U.S. at 617-18.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 615-16. The Court stated: "In none of these cases [The Palmyra, Har-
mony, Dobbins, Calero-Toledo, Goldsmith-Grant Co. ] did the Court apply the guilty-prop-
erty fiction to justify forfeiture when the owner had done all that reasonably could be
expected to prevent the unlawful use of his property." Id. at 616.
117. Id. at 617 (citing J.W. Goldsmith, Jr., 254 U.S. at 512, and Calero-Toledo, 416
U.S. at 683).
118. Id. at n.10. The Court noted: "Because the forfeiture provisions at issue here
exempt 'innocent owners' we again have no occasion to decide in this case whether it




cases has consistently held that an owner's interest in property is
forfeitable for the property's illegal use by another without the
owner's knowledge or consent to such use.119 The Court's
mechanical application of this precedent, however, discounted
several crucial factors distinguishing the vehicles and vessels
forfeited in many former cases from the Bennis automobile.
First, the Bennis vehicle falls into the class of forfeitable prop-
erty known as derivative contraband, or property that the crimi-
nal uses to commit the illegal act.120 A closer analysis of the
precedent cited within this note reveals an important fact
ignored by the Bennis Court. In The Palmyra,'2' Harmony,22
Dobbins' Distillery,'123 Van Oster,'124 J.W. Goldsmith-Grant 25 and
Colero-Toledo,26 the property seized was necessary to facilitate
the commission of the respective crimes. 127 For instance, it
would have been impossible for the crews of The Palmyra or The
Brig Malek Adhel'2 to violate the anti-piracy provisions of fed-
eral admiralty law without the vessel. Likewise, it would have
been impossible for those using the vehicles in Van Oster and
J. W. Goldsmith to illegally transport intoxicating liquors with-
out the automobiles. More specifically, forfeiture was deter-
mined to be the appropriate remedy in these cases because
without the vehicles and vessels, the illegal acts could not have
been committed. 129 In Bennis, however, despite the fact that Mr.
Bennis used to the car to accomplish the act of prostitution, the
car's mobile character was not a necessary condition to the com-
mission of the crime. Mr. Bennis could have just as easily drove
away with the prostitute, exited the car with her and consum-
mated the act elsewhere. 130 Therefore, the automobile forfeited
in Bennis was very much unlike the vessels and vehicles seized
119. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998.
120. Id. at 1004. The other two classes of property subject to forfeiture are (1) pure
contraband or property of such a nature that the mere possession of it constitutes the
crime, and (2) profit or proceeds from an illegal venture. Id.
121. 25 U.S. 1 (1827).
122. 43 U.S. 210 (1844).
123. 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
124. 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
125. 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
126. 416 U.S. 662 (1974).
127. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1005.
128. Id. at 1005 n.2.
129. Id. at 1006.
130. See id. at 1006 n.9 (citing Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 491). When one considers that
the Supreme Court of Michigan found the neighborhood in which Bennis was arrested to
be the nuisance, and not the Bennis vehicle itself, there would have been a greater nexus
between the conduct and nuisance if Mr. Bennis had engaged the services of the prosti-
tute in an apartment building stairwell. Id. at 1006. In fact, the strict liability rule
announced by the Bennis Court, coupled with the Supreme Court of Michigan's declara-
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and abated in the Court's previous forfeiture decisions, and thus
Bennis represents an extension rather than an application of for-
feiture law.
Second, although the Bennis Court begins its analysis with
The Palmyra, it is somewhat odd that the Court rested its hold-
ing on that case since The Palmyra Court had no occasion to
address the issue of whether due process requires an owner of
property to be afforded an innocent owner defense. 13 1 The Pal-
myra Court only established the broad rule that property of an
innocent owner, used by another for an illegal purpose, is forfeit-
able without inquiring into the owner's knowledge of the prop-
erty's illicit use or first obtaining an in personam conviction of
the wrongdoer.3 2
The Bennis Court also improperly characterized as obiter dic-
tum language used in Calero-Toledo that actually set forth a new
defense for a truly innocent owner. The Calero-Toledo Court
held that if an owner shows that he or she did everything reason-
ably possible to prevent the illegal use of his or her property, and
was not involved in nor aware of the illegal use, the property is
protected from forfeiture." Of course, while it is clear that the
Colero-Toledo Court created this new defense, exactly how the
defense applies to the facts of Bennis is not evident. It is simply
not clear how Mrs. Bennis could have prevented her husband
from using their car to solicit a prostitute. In fact, to prevent Mr.
Bennis from using the car for that purpose would necessarily
require Mrs. Bennis to have knowledge of her husband's propen-
sity to engage in such conduct.
The third way in which Bennis is readily distinguishable from
the prior forfeiture precedent used by the Court to abate the
Bennis vehicle is that Bennis is the only instance where the
property forfeited was jointly owned by spouses, each presuma-
bly with an equal right to possess, use and enjoy the property.
Prior to Bennis there was very little federal law as to the rights
tion that the neighborhood in which Bennis was arrested was the nuisance, would likely
result in the apartment building being forfeited.
131. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14. In The Palmyra, the owner claimed that the ves-
sel could not be forfeited without first convicting the crew of piracy. Id.
132. Id. The language announciated by The Palmyra Court that proved fateful to
Mrs. Bennis' claim was:-"The thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or rather
the offence is attached to the thing." Id. This language is the genesis of strict liability
forfeiture, which deprives innocent owners of their property without considering whether
they knew about the property's unlawful use. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 616 (citing The
Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14).
133. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689. The Calero-Toledo Court also recognized
that a property owner whose property was taken without his or her privity and consent




of an innocent co-owner of property. In fact, Bennis is the only
forfeiture case decided by the Court in which the property for-
feited was marital property. Marital property is seldom the sub-
ject of federal forfeiture proceedings because the ownership of
property by spouses is a state law matter.'
State forfeiture decisions involving jointly owned property
greatly conflict and typically turn on state property law, includ-
ing the manner in which the property is titled and how the state
classifies marital property. For instance, in Texas, a community
property state, 35 it has been held that a wife's undivided one-
half interest in a car she co-owns with her husband is forfeitable
despite the fact that her husband uses the car illegally without
the wife's knowledge or consent. 136 In common law states, how-
ever, the exact opposite result is reached. For instance, in State
v. One 1984 Toyota Truck, 137 a Maryland case, the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals held that the interests of an innocent
spouse in entireties property'38 cannot be forfeited due to the
other spouse's illegal use of the property. 139 The Maryland court
deemed the guilty spouse's conduct to be an attempt to encumber
the car without the other spouse's knowledge or consent.
40
Since one spouse cannot encumber or convey entireties property
without the other's knowledge or consent, the court held that the
guilty spouse's conduct cannot divest the innocent spouse of an
interest in property they own as tenants by the entireties.'
14
134. One of the few federal cases involving the forfeiture of marital property is
United States v. Reckmeyer, 809 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1987), in which the Court rejected a
wife's claim that her husband could not forfeit their jointly-owned property to the gov-
vernment pursuant to his plea bargain to a federal drug offense. Id. at 786. Federal
courts have also commanded the statutory forfeiture of an innocent wife's community
property interest because of a racketeering venture undertaken by her husband, which
violated various provisions of federal RICO laws. See United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d
796, 812 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980).
135. Community property is defined as "[piroperty owned in common by husband
and wife each having an undivided one-half interest by reason of their marital status."
BLACes LAw DIcTioNARY 280 (6th ed. 1991).
136. Amrani-Khaldi v. State, 575 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). The Court
held that the innocent wife's interest in the car is freely forfeitable because in community
property states, one spouse can freely encumber or obligate the community property with-
out the other spouse's knowledge or consent. Id.
137. 517 A.2d 103 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986), affd 533 A.2d 659 (Md. Ct. App. 1987).
138. A tenancy by the entirety is a form of property ownership in which a husband
and wife hold title to the whole of the property with a right of survivorship, so that upon
the death of one spouse, the whole immediately vests in the surviving partner. BLACK'S
LAw DICTIoNARY 1465 (6th ed. 1991). During the spouses lives, neither can convey or
encumber entireties property without the consent of the other. Id.





Thus, the innocent owner defense is very much alive and viable
in common law property states.
Joint ownership of the Bennis car is also significant because
the principal dissent in Bennis, which relied on Austin,'42 would
have held that Mrs. Bennis' interest in the car should not have
been forfeited absent a showing that she was somehow negligent
in entrusting the car to her husband. Justice Stevens, in dissent,
relied on a passage in Austin, where the Court in that case stated
that the long line of forfeiture precedent rests on the notion that
an owner is negligent in permitting his or her property to be used
for an illegal purpose, and, therefore, is properly punishable for
such negligence. 143 This reliance simply ignores that when prop-
erty is co-owned, especially as marital property, each owner pre-
sumably has an equal right to use and enjoy the property, and
one co-owner is without the power to deny the other the right to
use and possess the property. When property is co-owned, and
one owner uses the property illegally, it cannot be said that the
innocent co-owner negligently entrusted the other owner with
the property. Thus, if negligent entrustment is a necessary ele-
ment of statutory forfeiture law, as the Bennis dissent argued,
the only basis upon which the Bennis forfeiture was upheld is the
strict liability guilty-property fiction.'"
Even more incredibly, the Bennis Court concluded that
although forfeitures are limited by the Eight Amendment's pro-
hibition against excessive fines, 145 constitutional protection
played no part in the abatement of the Bennis automobile
because the Michigan Supreme Court characterized the state for-
feiture proceedings as equitable rather than punitive in
nature."4 This statement clearly exalts form over substance.
While the form of the proceedings may be characterized as equi-
table in nature, and therefore remedial rather than punitive, for-
feiture proceedings undisputably serve, in some fashion, to
punish the owner. 147 In fact, in the Bennis state court proceed-
142. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
143. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1007 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Austin, 509 U.S. at
615). Justice Stevens stated that Mrs. Bennis should not have suffered a forfeiture due to
Mr. Bennis' indiscretion absent a showing that she was either negligent in her use or
entrustment of the family car. Id. at 1007.
144. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14.
145. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000. The Bennis majority noted that although the Aus-
tin Court held that forfeiture serves a punitive purpose and is therefore subject to the
limitations of the Eighth Amendment, the innocent owner defense was not at issue in
Austin. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1006-07. Even the majority in Bennis conceded that such forfeiture pro-
ceedings are, to some degree, punitive. Id.
1997
Duquesne Law Review
ings, the state argued that the forfeiture proceedings would exact
"swift and certain punishment of the voluntary vice
consumer."'1
4
Permitting states to avoid the limitations imposed by the
Eighth Amendment's excessive fines clause simply by character-
izing forfeiture proceedings as remedial rather than punitive
ignores the obvious when the property to be abated is jointly
owned: co-owners of property are punished for the acts of the
other co-owner of the property. In Bennis, the fact that Mrs.
Bennis was punished for the illegal acts of her husband cannot
be denied. The Bennises owned their vehicle by the entireties
and Mrs. Bennis was divested of her interest in the vehicle by the
state abatement scheme without any consideration for her total
lack of criminal culpability. If the trial court had broad equitable
powers to order any disposition of the Bennis automobile as a
result of Mr. Bennis' illegal acts, then it certainly lacked any
remedial imagination.
149
In conclusion, the Bennis decision is indeed based on over one
hundred and sixty years of precedent consistently holding that
an innocent owner's interest in property is freely forfeitable
regardless of whether the owner is aware of the illegal use to
which his or her property is put. However, since the nature of
the relationship between the Bennises with respect to the for-
feited property was unlike any previously before the Court in a
forfeiture action, the Bennis Court's application of the forfeiture
precedent seems misplaced.
In sum, the lesson to be learned from the plight of Mrs. Bennis
is that if innocent owners wish to protect their property against
forfeiture for its illegal use by another, whether a co-owner,
bailee, or lessee, then the best and most effective means to do so
is to encourage the legislature to include provisions in the statu-
tory abatement scheme protecting the property. As the Bennis
Court teaches, protecting the property interests of innocent own-
ers of property used illegally is clearly not to be undertaken by
the courts.
Steven M. Regan
148. Id. at 1007.
149. MicH. Comp. LAws § 600.3825 (1987). The Michigan abatement statute
requires the sale of a vehicle adjudged a nuisance and the proceeds from the sale to first
be used to satisfy all costs and liens, and then be paid to the state. Id. The trial court
could have easily effectuated the intent of the nuisance abatement scheme by forfeiting
the wrongdoer's interest in the car, vesting the whole in Mrs. Bennis, and requiring Mr.
Bennis to pay the full value of the car to the court. The court could then see that the
proceeds be disbursed as the statute requires.
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